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Abstract
A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance
of different options which are the matter of a complete preferential
vote. Completeness means that every voter expresses a comparison
(a preference or a tie) about each pair of options. The proposed
method is proved to have certain desirable properties, which include:
the continuity of the rates with respect to the data, a decomposi-
tion property that characterizes certain situations opposite to a tie,
the Condorcet-Smith principle, and clone consistency. One can view
this rating method as a complement for the ranking method intro-
duced in 1997 by Markus Schulze. It is also related to certain methods
of one-dimensional scaling or cluster analysis.
Keywords: preferential voting, quantitative rating, continuous rat-
ing, majority principles, Condorcet-Smith principle, clone consistency,
one-dimensional scaling, ultrametrics.
AMS subject classifications: 05C20, 91B12, 91B14, 91C15, 91C20.
The outcome of a vote is commonly expected to specify not only a winner
and an ordering of the candidates, but also a quantitative estimate of the
social acceptance of each of them. Such a quantification is expected even
when the individual votes give only qualitative information.
The simplest voting methods are clearly based upon such a quantifi-
cation. This is indeed the case of the plurality count as well as that of
the Borda count. However, it is well known that these methods do not
comply with basic majority principles nor with other desirable conditions.
In order to satisfy certain combinations of such principles and conditions,
one must resort to other more elaborate methods, such as the celebrated rule
of Condorcet, Keme´ny and Young [12 ; 20 : p. 182–190 ], the method of ranked
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pairs [19 , 21 ; 20 : p. 219–223 ], or the method introduced in 1997 by Markus
Schulze [15 , 16 ; 20 : p. 228–232 ], which we will refer to as the method of paths.
Now, as they stand, these methods rank the candidates in a purely ordinal
way, without properly quantifying the social acceptance of each of them.
So, it is natural to ask for a method that combines the above-mentioned
principles and conditions with a quantitative rating of the candidates.
A quantitative rating should allow to sense the closeness between two
candidates, such as the winner and the runner-up. For that purpose, it is
essential that the rates vary in a continuous way, especially through situations
where ties or multiple orders occur.
On the other hand, it should also allow to recognise certain situations
that are opposite to a tie. For instance, a candidate should get the best
possible rate if and only if it has been placed first by all voters. This is a
particular case of a more general condition that we will call decomposition.
This condition, that will be made precise later on, places sharp constraints
on the rates that should be obtained when the candidates are partitioned in
two classes X and Y such that each member of X is unanimously preferred
to every member of Y .
In this article we will produce a rating method that combines such a
quantitative character with other desirable properties of a qualitative nature.
Among them we will be especially interested in the following extension of the
Condorcet principle introduced in 1973 by John H. Smith [17 ]: Assume that
the set of candidates is partitioned in two classes X and Y such that for
each member of X and every member of Y there are more than half of the
individual votes where the former is preferred to the latter; in that case, the
social ranking should also prefer each member of X to any member of Y .
This principle is quite pertinent when one is interested not only in choosing
a winner but also in ranking all the alternatives (or in rating them).
To our knowledge, the existing literature does not offer any other rating
method that combines this principle with the above-mentioned quantitative
properties of continuity and decomposition. We will refer to our method as
the CLC rating method , where the capital letters stand for “Continuous
Llull Condorcet”. The reader interested to try it can use the CLC calculator
which has been made available at [13 ].
Of course, any rating automatically implies a ranking. In this connection,
it should be noticed that the CLC rating method is built upon Schulze’s
method of paths as underlying ranking method. As we will remark in the
concluding section, we doubt that any of the other ranking methods men-
tioned above could be extended to a rating method with the properties of
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continuity and decomposition. Having said that, it should be clear that the
present work is not aimed at saying anything new about ranking methods as
such. Whatever we might say about them will always be in reference to the
rating issue.
By reasons of space, this article is restricted to the complete case and to
a particular class of rates that we call rank-like rates. We are in the com-
plete case when every individual expresses a comparison (a preference or a
tie) about each pair of options. The incomplete case requires some addi-
tional developments that are dealt with in a separate article [3 ]. In another
separate article we deal with another class of rates that have a fraction-like
character [4 ].
The present article is organized as follows: Section 1 gives a more pre-
cise statement of the problem and finishes with a general remark. Section 2
presents an heuristic outline of our proposal, ending with a summary of the
procedure and an illustrative example. Section 3 introduces some mathemat-
ical language. Sections 4–10 give detailed mathematical proofs of the claimed
properties. Sections 11–12 are devoted to other interesting properties of the
concomitant social ranking, namely clone consistency and two weak forms of
monotonicity. Finally, section 13 makes some concluding remarks and poses
a few open questions.
1 Statement of the problem and a general remark
1.1 Let us consider a set of N options which are the matter of a vote. Let
us assume that each voter expresses his preferences in a qualitative way, for
instance by listing those options in order of preference. Our aim is to combine
such individual preferences so as to rate the social acceptance of each option
on a continuous scale. More specifically, we would like to do it in accordance
with the following conditions:
A Scale invariance (homogeneity). The rates depend only on the rela-
tive frequency of each possible content of an individual vote. In other
words, if every individual vote is replaced by a fixed number of copies
of it, the rates remain exactly the same.
B Permutation equivariance (neutrality). Applying a certain permuta-
tion of the options to all of the individual votes has no other effect
than getting the same permutation in the social rating.
C Continuity. The rates depend continuously on the relative frequency
of each possible content of an individual vote.
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The next two conditions choose a specific form of rating. From now on
we will refer to it as rank-like rating. In the complete case considered in the
present paper, these two conditions take the following form:
D Rank-like form (complete case). Each rank-like rate is a number,
integer or fractional, between 1 and N . The best possible value
is 1 and the worst possible one is N . The average rank-like rate
is (N + 1)/2.
E Rank-like decomposition (complete case). Consider a splitting of the
options in two classes X and Y . Consider the case where each mem-
ber of X is unanimously preferred to every member of Y . This fact
is equivalent to each of the following ones, where |X| denotes the
number of elements of X : (a) The rank-like rates of X coincide with
those that one obtains when the individual votes are restricted to X .
(b) After diminishing them by the number |X| , the rank-like rates
of Y coincide with those that one obtains when the individual
votes are restricted to Y . (c) The average rank-like rate of X is
(|X|+ 1)/2.
In particular, an option will get a rank-like rate exactly equal to 1 if and
only if it is unanimously preferred to any other. Similarly, an option will get
a rank-like rate exactly equal to N if and only if it is unanimously considered
worse than any other.
Finally, we require a condition that concerns only the concomitant social
ranking, that is, the ordinal information contained in the social rating:
M Condorcet-Smith principle. Consider a splitting of the options in
two classes X and Y . Assume that for each member of X and
every member of Y there are more than half of the individual votes
where the former is preferred to the latter. In that case, the social
ranking also prefers each member of X to every member of Y .
1.2 Let us emphasize that the individual votes that we are dealing with do
not have a quantitative character (at least for the moment): each voter is
allowed to express a preference for x rather than y , or vice versa, or maybe
a tie between them, but he is not allowed to quantify such a preference.
This contrasts with “range voting” methods, where each individual vote is
already a quantitative rating [20 : p. 174–176; 1 ]. Such methods are free from
many of the difficulties that lurk behind the present setting. However, they
make sense only as long as all voters mean the same by each possible value
of the rating variable. This hypothesis may be reasonable in some cases, but
in many others it is hardly valid. In fact, voting is often used in connection
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with moral, psychological or aesthetic qualities, whose appreciation may be
as little quantifiable, but also as much “comparable”, as, for instance, the
feelings of pleasure or pain.
In our case, the quantitative character of the output will derive from the
fact of having a certain number of qualitative preferences. The larger this
number, the more meaningful will be the quantitative character of the social
rating. This is especially applicable to the continuity property C, according
to which a small variation in the proportion of votes with a given content
produces only small variations in the rates. In fact, a few votes will be a
small proportion only in the measure that the total number of votes is large
enough.
2 Heuristic outline
This section presents our proposal as the result of a quest for the desired
properties. Hopefully, this will communicate the main ideas that lie behind
the formulas.
2.1 The aim of complying with condition M calls for the point of view of
paired comparisons . So our starting point will be the numbers Vxy that
count how many voters prefer x to y . In this connection we will take the
view that each vote that ties x with y is equivalent to half a vote preferring
x to y plus another half a vote preferring y to x . In order to achieve
scale invariance, we will immediately switch to the corresponding fractions
vxy = Vxy/V , where V denotes the total number of votes. The numbers vxy
will be called the binary scores of the vote, and their collection will be
called the Llull matrix of the vote. Since we are considering the case of
complete votes, these numbers are assumed to satisfy
vxy + vyx = 1. (1)
Besides the scores vxy , in the sequel we will often deal with the margins
mxy , which are defined by
mxy = vxy − vyx. (2)
Obviously, their dependence on the pair xy is antisymmetric, that is
myx = −mxy. (3)
It is clear also that the equality (1) allows to recover the scores from the
margins by means of the following formula:
vxy = (1 +mxy)/2. (4)
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2.2 A natural candidate for defining the social preference is the following:
x is socially preferred to y whenever vxy > vyx . Of course, it can happen that
vxy = vyx , in which case one would consider that x is socially tied with y .
The binary relation that includes all pairs xy for which vxy > vyx will be
denoted by µ(v) and will be called the comparison relation ; together with
it, we will consider also the relation µˆ(v) defined by the non-strict inequality
vxy ≥ vyx .
As it is well known, the main problem with paired comparisons is that
the comparison relations µ(v) and µˆ(v) may lack transitivity even if the
individual preferences are all of them transitive [11, 20 ].
2.3 The next developments rely upon an operation (vxy) → (v∗xy) that
transforms the original system of binary scores into a new one. This operation
is defined in the following way: for every pair xy , one considers all possible
paths x0x1 . . . xn going from x0 = x to xn = y ; every such path is associated
with the score of its weakest link, i. e. the smallest value of vxixi+1 ; finally,
v∗xy is defined as the maximum value of this associated score over all paths
from x to y . In other words,
v∗xy = max
x0 = x
xn = y
min
i ≥ 0
i < n
vxixi+1 , (5)
where the max operator considers all possible paths from x to y , and the
min operator considers all the links of a particular path. The scores v∗xy will
be called the indirect scores associated with the (direct) scores vxy .
If (vxy) is the table of 0’s and 1’s associated with a binary relation ρ
(by putting vxy = 1 if and only if xy ∈ ρ), then (v∗xy) is exactly the table
associated with ρ∗ , the transitive closure of ρ . So, the operation (vxy) 7→
(v∗xy) can be viewed as a quantitative analogue of the notion of transitive
closure (see [6 : Ch. 25 ]).
The main point, remarked in 1998 by Markus Schulze [15 b ], is that the
comparison relation associated with a table of indirect scores is always tran-
sitive (Theorem 4.3). So, µ(v∗) is always transitive, no matter what the
case is for µ(v). This is true in spite of the fact that µ(v∗) can easily differ
from µ∗(v) (the transitive closure of µ(v)).
2.4 In the following we put
κ = µ(v∗), κˆ = µˆ(v∗), mκxy = v
∗
xy − v∗yx. (6)
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So, xy ∈ κ if and only if v∗xy > v∗yx , i. e. mκxy > 0, and xy ∈ κˆ if and only if
v∗xy ≥ v∗yx , i. e. mκxy ≥ 0. From now on we will refer to κ as the indirect
comparison relation , and to mκxy as the indirect margin associated with
the pair xy .
As it has been stated above, the relation κ is transitive. Besides that,
it is clearly asymmetric (one cannot have both v∗xy > v
∗
yx and vice versa).
On the other hand, it may be incomplete (one can have v∗xy = v
∗
yx ). When it
differs from κ , the complete relation κˆ is not asymmetric and —somewhat
surprisingly— it may be not transitive either. However, one can always find
a total order ξ that satisfies κ ⊆ ξ ⊆ κˆ (Theorem 5.1). From now on,
any total order ξ that satisfies this condition will be called an admissible
order . Let us remark that such a definition is redundant: in fact, one easily
sees that each of the required inclusions implies the other one.
The rating that we are looking for will be based on such an order ξ .
More specifically, it will be compatible with ξ in the sense that the rank-
like rates Rx will satisfy the inequality Rx ≤ Ry whenever xy ∈ ξ . If κ is
already a total order, so that ξ = κ , the preceding inequality will be satisfied
in the strict form Rx < Ry , and this will happen if and only if xy ∈ κ .
The following steps assume that one has fixed an admissible order ξ .
From now on the situation xy ∈ ξ will be expressed also by x ξ y . According
to the definitions, the inclusions κ ⊆ ξ ⊆ κˆ are equivalent to saying that
v∗xy > v
∗
yx implies x ξ y and that the latter implies v∗xy ≥ v∗yx . In other
words, if the different options are ordered according to ξ , the matrix v∗xy
has then the property that each element above the diagonal is larger than or
equal to its symmetric over the diagonal.
2.5 Rating the different options means positioning them on a line. Besides
complying with the qualitative restriction of being compatible with ξ in the
sense above, we want that the distances between items reflect the quantitative
information provided by the binary scores. However, a rating is expressed
by N numbers, whereas the binary scores are N(N −1) numbers. So we are
bound to do some sort of projection. Problems of this kind have a certain
tradition in combinatorial data analysis and cluster analysis [10, 8 ]. In fact,
some of the operations that will be used below can be viewed from that point
of view.
Let us assume for a while that the votes are total orders, i. e. each vote lists
all the options by order of preference, without any ties. This is the standard
case for the application of Borda’s method, which is linearly equivalent to
rating each option by the mean value of its ranks, i. e. the ordinal numbers
8 R. Camps, X. Mora, L. Saumell
that give its position in these different orders. As it was noticed by Borda
himself (in his setting linearly related to ours), these mean ranks, which we
will denote by r¯x , can be obtained from the Llull matrix by means of the
following formula:
r¯x = N −
∑
y 6=x
vxy, (7)
or equivalently,
r¯x = (N + 1−
∑
y 6=x
mxy ) / 2. (8)
Let us look at the meaning of the margins mxy in connection with the
idea of projecting the Llull matrix into a rating: If there are no other items
than x and y , we can certainly view the sign and magnitude of mxy as giving
respectively the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the relative positions
of x and y on the rating line, that is, the order and the distance between
them. When there are more than two items, however, we have several pieces
of information of this kind, one for every pair, and these different pieces
may be incompatible with each other, quantitatively or even qualitatively,
which motivates indeed the problem that we are dealing with. In particular,
the mean ranks r¯x often violate the desired compatibility with the relation ξ .
In order to construct a rating compatible with ξ , we will use a formula
analogous to (7) where the scores vxy are replaced by certain projected
scores vpixy to be defined in the following paragraphs. Together with them,
we will make use of the corresponding projected margins mpixy = v
pi
xy−vpiyx .
Like the original scores (but not necessarily the indirect ones) the projected
scores will be required to satisfy the equality vpixy + v
pi
yx = 1, from which it
follows that vpixy = (1 +m
pi
xy)/2. So, the rates that we are looking for will be
obtained in the following way:
Rx = N −
∑
y 6=x
vpixy, (9)
or equivalently,
Rx = (N + 1−
∑
y 6=x
mpixy ) / 2. (10)
Such formulas will be used not only in the case where the votes are total
orders, but also in more general situations.
2.6 Our goals will be achieved by defining the projected margins in the
following way, where we assume x ξ y and x′ denotes the item that imme-
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diately follows x in the total order ξ :
mκxy = v
∗
xy − v∗yx, (11)
mσxy = min {mκpq | p −
ξ x, y −
ξ q }, (12)
mpixy = max {mσpp′ | x −
ξ p ξ y }, (13)
mpiyx = −mpixy. (14)
As one can easily check, this construction ensures that
mpixz = max (m
pi
xy,m
pi
yz), whenever x ξ y ξ z . (15)
From this equality it follows that the absolute values dxy = |mpixy| satisfy the
following inequality, which makes no reference to the relation ξ :
dxz ≤ max (dxy, dyz), for any x, y, z . (16)
This condition, called the ultrametric inequality, is well known in cluster
analysis, where it appears as a necessary and sufficient condition for the
dissimilarities dxy to define a hierarchical classification of the set under con-
sideration [10 : § 7.2; 8 : § 3.2.1 ].
Remark. The operation (mκxy) → (mpixy) defined by (12–13) is akin to the
single-link method of cluster analysis, which can be viewed as a continuous
method for projecting a matrix of dissimilarities onto the set of ultrametric
distances; such a continuous projection is achieved by taking the maximal
ultrametric distance which is bounded by the given matrix of dissimilarities
[10 : § 7.3, 7.4, 8.3, 9.3 ]. The operation (mκxy) → (mpixy) does the same kind of
job under the constraint that the clusters be intervals of the total order ξ .
2.7 Summary of the procedure
0. Form the Llull matrix (vxy) (§ 2.1).
1. Compute the indirect scores v∗xy defined by (5). An efficient way to
do it is the Floyd-Warshall algorithm [6 : § 25.2 ]. Work out the indirect
margins mκxy=v
∗
xy−v∗yx .
2. Consider the indirect comparison relation κ = {xy | mκxy > 0} .
Fix an admissible order ξ , i. e. a total order that extends κ . For in-
stance, it suffices to arrange the options by non-decreasing values of
the “tie-splitting” Copeland scores rx = N − |{ y | y 6= x, mκxy > 0}|
− 1
2
|{ y | y 6=x, mκxy=0}| (Proposition 5.2).
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3. Starting from the indirect margins mκxy , work out the superdiagonal
intermediate projected margins mσxx′ as defined in (12).
4. Compute the projected margins mpixy according to (13–14). The pro-
jected scores are then determined by the formula vpixy = (1 +m
pi
xy)/2.
5. Compute the rank-like rates Rx according to (9) (here equivalent to (10)).
The computing time is of order N3 , where N is the number of options.
The CLC calculator made available at [13 ] allows to follow the details of the
procedure by choosing the option “Detailed mode”.
2.8 Example. As an illustrative example we will consider the final round
of a dancesport competition. Specifically, we have chosen the Professional
Latin Rising Star section of the 2007 Blackpool Dance Festival (Blackpool,
England, 25th May 2007). The data were taken from http://www.scrutelle.
info/results/estelle/2007/blackpool-2007/. As usual, the final was con-
tested by six couples, whose competition numbers were 3 , 4 , 31 , 122 , 264
and 238 . Eleven adjudicators ranked their simultaneous performances in
four equivalent dances.
The all-round official result was 3  122  264  4  31  238 . This re-
sult comes from the so-called “Skating System”, whose name reflects a prior
use in figure-skating. The Skating System has a first part which produces
a separate result for each dance. This is done mainly on the basis of the
median rank obtained by each couple (by the way, this criterion underlies
the “practical” method that Condorcet was proposing in 1792/93 [11 : ch. 8 ]).
However, the fine properties of this criterion are lost in the second part of
the Skating System, where the all-round result is obtained by adding up the
final ranks obtained in the different dances.
From the point of view of paired comparisons, it makes sense to base the
all-round result on the Llull matrix which collects the 44 rankings produced
by the 11 adjudicators over the 4 dances. As one can see below, in the
present case this matrix exhibits several Condorcet cycles, like for instance
3  4  264  3 and 3  122  264  3 , which means that the competition
was closely contested. In consonance with it, the CLC rates obtained below
are quite close to each other, particularly for the couples 3 , 4 , 122 and 264 .
By the way, the CLC result orders the contestants differently than the Borda
rule, whose associated ordering is 122  3  4  264  31  238 .
Instead of relative scores and margins, the following tables show their
absolute counterparts, i. e. without dividing by the total number of votes.
This has the virtue of staying with small integer numbers.
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x
3
4
31
122
238
264
Original scores
Vxy
3 4 31 122 238 264
∗ 23 28 23 28 20
21 ∗ 23 20 30 24
16 21 ∗ 15 25 18
21 24 29 ∗ 28 23
16 14 19 16 ∗ 19
24 20 26 21 25 ∗
Indirect scores
V ∗xy
3 4 31 122 238 264
∗ 23 28 23 28 23
24 ∗ 24 23 30 24
21 21 ∗ 21 25 21
24 24 29 ∗ 28 24
19 19 19 19 ∗ 19
24 23 26 23 25 ∗
Ranks
rx
4
2
5
1
6
3
x
122
4
264
3
31
238
Indirect margins
Mκxy
122 4 264 3 31 238
∗ 1 1 1 8 9
∗ ∗ 1 1 3 11
∗ ∗ ∗ 1 5 6
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 7 9
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 6
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Projected margins
Mpixy
122 4 264 3 31 238
∗ 1 1 1 3 6
∗ ∗ 1 1 3 6
∗ ∗ ∗ 1 3 6
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 3 6
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 6
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Rates
Rx
3.3636
3.3864
3.4091
3.4318
3.5682
3.8409
3 Mathematical setting
We consider a finite set A . Its elements represent the options which are the
matter of a vote. The number of elements of A is N .
In order to deal with preferences we must consider (ordered) pairs of ele-
ments of A . The pair formed by a and b , in this order, will be denoted simply
as ab . The pairs that consist of two copies of the same element, i. e. those
of the form aa , are not relevant for our purposes. So, we will systematically
exclude them from our considerations. This will help towards a more efficient
language. The set of all proper pairs, i. e. the pairs ab with a 6= b , will be
denoted as Π . Unless we say otherwise, from now on any statement will be
understood to imply the assumption that all the pairs that appear in it are
proper pairs, i. e. they belong to Π .
Besides pairs, we will be concerned also with longer sequences a0a1 . . . an ,
which will be referred to as paths.
3.1 As one could see in the heuristic outline, our developments make use of
the mathematical concept of (binary) relation . Stating that two elements
a and b are in a certain relation ρ is equivalent to saying that the pair ab
is a member of a certain set ρ . Because of what has been said, unless we
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say otherwise we will restrict our attention to strict relations, i. e. relations
contained in Π . Under the convention made above, we can keep the following
standard definitions.1 A relation ρ ⊆ Π will be called : asymmetric when
ab ∈ ρ implies ba 6∈ ρ ; total , or complete , when ab 6∈ ρ implies ba ∈ ρ ;
transitive when the simultaneous occurrence of ab ∈ ρ and bc ∈ ρ implies
ac ∈ ρ ; a partial order when it is transitive and asymmetric; a total
order when it is transitive, asymmetric and total; a total preorder when
it is transitive and total.
Given a relation ρ , we will often consider the relation ρˆ that consists of
all pairs ab such that ba 6∈ ρ ; ρˆ is called the codual of ρ . The following
lemma collects several properties which are immediate consequences of the
definitions:
Lemma 3.1.
(a) ˆˆρ = ρ.
(b) ρ ⊂ σ ⇐⇒ σˆ ⊂ ρˆ .
(c) ρ is asymmetric ⇐⇒ ρ ⊆ ρˆ ⇐⇒ ρˆ is total.
(d) ρ is total ⇐⇒ ρˆ ⊆ ρ ⇐⇒ ρˆ is asymmetric.
The transitive closure of ρ , which we will denote as ρ∗ , is defined as
follows: ab ∈ ρ∗ if and only if there exists a path a0a1 . . . an from a0 = a to
an = b such that aiai+1 ∈ ρ for every i . ρ∗ is the minimum transitive rela-
tion that contains ρ . The transitive-closure operator is easily seen to have
the following properties: ρ∗ ⊆ σ∗ whenever ρ ⊆ σ ; (ρ ∩ σ)∗ ⊆ (ρ∗) ∩ (σ∗);
(ρ∗) ∪ (σ∗) ⊆ (ρ ∪ σ)∗ ; (ρ∗)∗ = ρ∗ .
A subset C ⊆ A is said to be autonomous for a relation ρ when,
for any x 6∈ C , having ax ∈ ρ for some a ∈ C implies bx ∈ ρ for any
b ∈ C , and similarly, having xa ∈ ρ for some a ∈ C implies xb ∈ ρ for any
b ∈ C (see for instance [2 ]). On the other hand, C ⊆ A will be said to be
an interval for a relation ρ when the simultaneous occurrence of ax ∈ ρ
and xb ∈ ρ with a, b ∈ C implies x ∈ C . The following facts are easy
consequences of the definitions: If ρ is asymmetric and C is autonomous
for ρ then C is an interval for ρ . If ρ is total and C is an interval for ρ then
C is autonomous for ρ . As a corollary, if ρ is total and asymmetric, then C
is autonomous for ρ if and only if it is an interval for that relation. Later
on we will make use of the following fact, which is also an easy consequence
of the definitions:
1An equivalent way to put it is that we accept a relation ρ ⊆ Π as total / transitive,
whenever ρ ∪ {xx | x ∈ A} has the corresponding property in the standard sense.
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Lemma 3.2. C is autonomous for ρ ⇐⇒ C is autonomous for ρˆ .
When C is an autonomous set for ρ , it is natural to consider a new set A˜
and a new relation ρ˜ by proceeding in the following way: A˜ is obtained from
A by replacing the set C by a single element c˜ , i. e. A˜ = (A \ C) ∪ {c˜} ;
for every x ∈ A , let us denote by x˜ the element of A˜ defined by x˜ = c˜
if x ∈ C and by x˜ = x if x 6∈ C ; with this notation, ρ˜ is defined by
putting x˜y˜ ∈ ρ˜ if and only if xy ∈ ρ whenever x˜ 6= y˜ (this definition is not
ambiguous since C is autonomous for ρ). We will refer to this operation as
the contraction of ρ by the autonomous set C .
Any relation can be interpreted as expressing a system of qualitative
preferences: having xy ∈ ρ and yx 6∈ ρ means that x is preferred to y ;
having both xy ∈ ρ and yx ∈ ρ means that x is tied with y ; having neither
xy ∈ ρ nor yx ∈ ρ means that no information is given about the preference
between x and y .
From this point of view, it is quite natural to rank the different x ∈ A
by taking into account the number of y such that x is preferred to y as well
as the number of y such that x is tied with y . More precisely, it makes sense
to define the rank of x in a relation ρ by the formula
rx = N −
∣∣{ y | xy∈ρ, yx 6∈ρ}∣∣ − 1
2
∣∣{ y | xy∈ρ, yx∈ρ}∣∣. (17)
Ranking by rx is often considered in connection with tournaments. Such a
method is known as the Copeland rule (see for instance [20 : p. 206–209 ], where
the tie-splitting term is not present —since ties are not occurring— and an
equivalent formulation is used). The next lemma is an easy consequence of
the definitions. Its second part justifies using the term ‘rank’.
Lemma 3.3. If ρ is a partial order, then having xy ∈ ρ implies rx < ry .
If ρ is a total order, then having xy ∈ ρ is equivalent to rx < ry ; in fact,
rx coincides then with the ordinal number that gives the position of x in ρ.
3.2 The Llull matrix of a vote, as well as the analogous matrices formed
respectively by the indirect scores and by the projected scores, are all of them
particular instances of the abstract notion of valued relation (also called
‘fuzzy relation’). In fact, a valued relation on A means simply a mapping v
whereby every pair xy ∈ Π is assigned a score vxy in the interval [0, 1].
The score vxy measures “how much” is x related to y . Here and in the
following we keep the notation and terminology introduced in the preceding
sections.
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Most of the notions that are associated with relations can be generalized
to valued relations (sometimes in several different ways). Some of these
generalized notions have already appeared in the heuristic outline of § 2.
For instance, we have already remarked that the indirect scores v∗xy generalize
the notion of transitive closure. Another generalized notion, namely that of
autonomous set, will appear in § 11.
Here we will only remark that for our purposes the valued analogues of
asymmetry and totality are respectively the conditions vxy + vyx ≤ 1 and
vxy + vyx ≥ 1.
3.3 In general terms, the problem of preference aggregation deals with
valued relations whose scores satisfy the condition vxy + vyx ≤ 1. The set of
all such objects will be denoted by Ω. So, Ω = { v ∈ [0, 1]Π | vxy + vyx ≤ 1 } .
The complete case corresponds to the subset Γ determined by the equality
vxy + vyx = 1. So, Γ = { v ∈ [0, 1]Π | vxy + vyx = 1 } .
The sets Ω and Γ are respectively the fields of variation of the collective
Llull matrix of a vote in the general case and in the complete one. On the
other hand, the individual votes can also be viewed as belonging to these sets.
In fact, any qualitative expression of preferences (not necesarily transitive)
between the elements of A can be represented as a Llull matrix, i. e. an
element of Ω, by putting
vxy =

1, if x is preferred to y,
1/2, if x is tied with y,
0, if either y is preferred to x or no information
is given about the preference between x and y.
(18)
Such a mapping satisfies vxy +vyx = 1 whenever we are in the complete case,
i. e. when either a preference or a tie is expressed about each pair of options.
According to its definition, the collective Llull matrix is simply the center of
gravity of the distribution of individual votes:
vxy =
∑
k
αk v
k
xy, (19)
where vk are the Llull matrices associated with the individual votes, and αk
are the corresponding relative frequencies or weights.
Since the individual votes play no other role than contributing to the
collective Llull matrix as described by the preceding equation, generally
speaking there is no need to restrict them to express qualitative prefer-
ences only, but one can allow them to express valued preferences, i. e. to be
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arbitrary elements of Ω (of Γ in the complete case). Such a possibility makes
sense in that the individual opinions may already be the result of aggregating
a variety of criteria.
The preceding idea of representing a system of valued preferences as an
element of Ω appears already in [9 ].
4 The indirect scores and the associated comparison relation
Let us recall that the indirect scores v∗xy are defined in the following way:
v∗xy = max {vα | α is a path x0x1 . . . xn from x0 = x to xn = y },
where the score vα of a path α = x0x1 . . . xn is defined as
vα = min {vxixi+1 | 0 ≤ i < n }.
Remark. The matrix of indirect scores v∗ can be viewed as a power of v
(supplemented with vxx = 1) for a matrix product defined in the following
way: (vw)xz = maxy min(vxy, wyz). More precisely, v
∗ coincides with such a
power for any exponent greater than or equal to N − 1.
Lemma 4.1. The indirect scores satisfy the following inequalities:
v∗xz ≥ min (v∗xy, v∗yz) for any x, y, z . (20)
Proof. Let α be a path from x to y such that v∗xy = vα ; let β be a path
from y to z such that v∗yz = vβ . Consider now their concatenation αβ . Since
αβ goes from x to z , one has v∗xz ≥ vαβ . On the other hand, the definition
of the score of a path ensures that vαβ = min (vα, vβ). Putting these things
together gives the desired result.
Lemma 4.2. Assume that the original scores satisfy the following inequal-
ities:
vxz ≥ min (vxy, vyz) for any x, y, z . (21)
In that case, the indirect scores coincide with the original ones.
Proof. The inequality v∗xz ≥ vxz is an immediate consequence of the defini-
tion of v∗xz . The converse inequality can be obtained in the following way:
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Let γ = x0x1x2 . . . xn be a path from x to z such that v
∗
xz = vγ . By virtue
of (21), we have
min
(
vx0x1 , vx1x2 , vx2x3 , . . . , vxn−1xn
) ≤ min ( vx0x2 , vx2x3 , . . . , vxn−1xn) .
So, v∗xz ≤ vγ′ where γ′ = x0x2 . . . xn . By iteration, one eventually gets
v∗xz ≤ vxz .
Remark. On the basis of the preceding results it makes sense to take condi-
tion (21) as the definition of transitivity for a valued relation (vxy).
The matrix of indirect scores v∗ can be characterized as the lowest one that
lies above v and satisfies such a notion of transitivity; a proof of this fact
—in a more general setting— will be found in [5 : Theorem 3.3 ].
Theorem 4.3 (Schulze, 1998 [15 b ]; see also [20 : p. 228–229 ]). The indirect
comparison relation κ = µ(v∗) is a partial order.
Proof. Since µ(v∗) is clearly asymmetric, it is only a matter of showing its
transitivity. We will argue by contradiction. Let us assume that
xy ∈ µ(v∗) and yz ∈ µ(v∗), but xz /∈ µ(v∗). This means respectively
that (a) v∗xy > v
∗
yx and (b) v
∗
yz > v
∗
zy , but (c) v
∗
zx ≥ v∗xz . On the other
hand, Lemma 4.1 ensures also that (d) v∗xz ≥ min (v∗xy, v∗yz). We will dis-
tinguish two cases depending on which of the last two quantities is smaller:
(i) v∗yz ≥ v∗xy ; (ii) v∗xy ≥ v∗yz .
Case (i) : v∗yz ≥ v∗xy . We will see that in this case (c) and (d) entail a
contradiction with (a). In fact, we have the following chain of inequalities:
v∗yx ≥ min (v∗yz, v∗zx) ≥ min (v∗yz, v∗xz) ≥ min (v∗yz, v∗xy) = v∗xy , where we are
using successively: Lemma 4.1, (c), (d) and (i).
Case (ii) : v∗xy ≥ v∗yz . An entirely analogous argument shows that in this
case (c) and (d) entail a contradiction with (b). In fact, we have v∗zy ≥
min (v∗zx, v
∗
xy) ≥ min (v∗xz, v∗xy) ≥ min (v∗yz, v∗xy) = v∗yz , where we are using
successively: Lemma 4.1, (c), (d) and (ii).
5 Admissible orders
Let us recall that an admissible order is a total order ξ such that κ ⊆ ξ ⊆ κˆ .
Let us recall also that this definition is redundant since each of the two
inclusions implies the other one. So an admissible order is simply a total
order that extends the partial order κ . The results that follow deal with the
existence and efficient finding of such extensions.
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Theorem 5.1 (Szpilrajn, 1930 [18 ]). Given a partial order ρ on a finite
set A, one can always find a total order ξ such that ρ ⊆ ξ ⊆ ρˆ . If ρ
contains neither xy nor yx, one can constrain ξ to include the pair xy .
Proposition 5.2. Let ρ be a partial order. Let rx denote the rank of x
in ρ as defined by equation (17) of § 3.1. Any total ordering of the elements
of A by non-decreasing values of rx is an extension of ρ.
Proof. Let ξ be a total order of A for which x 7→ rx does not decrease.
This means that xy ∈ ξ implies rx ≤ ry . Now, the contrapositive of the first
statement in Lemma 3.3 ensures that rx ≤ ry implies yx 6∈ ρ , i. e. xy ∈ ρˆ .
So ξ ⊆ ρˆ , from which it follows that also ρ ⊆ ξ .
Remark. The preceding proposition replaces the problem of finding a total
order that contains ρ by the similar problem of finding a total order contained
in the total preorder ωˆ = {xy ∈ Π | rx ≤ ry} . However, from a practical
point of view the latter is a much easier thing to do, since one is guided by
the function x 7→ rx .
6 The projection
Let us recall that our rating method is based upon certain projected scores vpixy .
These quantities are obtained through the corresponding margins mpixy by
means of the procedure (11–14). That procedure makes use of an admissible
order ξ , whose existence has been dealt with in the preceding section, and
it assumes xy ∈ ξ .
Lemma 6.1. The projected margins mpixy have the following properties:
0 ≤ mpixy ≤ 1, whenever x ξ y. (22)
(15) mpixz = max (m
pi
xy,m
pi
yz), whenever x ξ y ξ z. (23)
Proof. Both properties are immediate consequences of (11–14) and the fact
that 0 ≤ mκxy ≤ 1.
Theorem 6.2. The projected scores do not depend on the admissible order ξ
used for their calculation, i. e. the value of vpixy is independent of ξ for
every xy ∈ Π . On the other hand, the matrix of the projected scores in an
admissible order ξ is also independent of ξ ; i. e. if xi denotes the element
of rank i in ξ , the value of vpixixj is independent of ξ for every pair of
indices i, j .
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Remark. The two statements say different things since the identity of xi and
xj may depend on the admissible order ξ .
Proof. Let us consider the effect of replacing ξ by another admissible order ξ˜ .
In the following, the tilde is systematically used to distinguish between hom-
ologous objects which are associated respectively with ξ and ξ˜ ; in particular,
such a notation will be used in connection with the labels of the equations
which are formulated in terms of the assumed admissible order.
With this terminology, we will prove the two following equalities, which
amount to the two statements of the theorem. First,
mpixy = m˜
pi
xy, for any pair xy (x 6= y). (24)
Secondly, we will see also that
mpixixj = m˜
pi
x˜ix˜j
, for any pair of indices ij (i 6= j), (25)
where xi denotes the element of rank i in ξ , and analogously for x˜i in ξ˜ .
Now, it is well known that the set of total order extensions of a given
partial order is always connected through transpositions of consecutive elem-
ents (see for instance [7 : p. 30 ]). Therefore, it suffices to deal with the case
of two admissible orders ξ and ξ˜ which differ from each other only by the
transposition of two consecutive elements. So, we will assume that there
are two elements a and b such that the only difference between ξ and ξ˜ is
that ξ contains ab whereas ξ˜ contains ba . According to the definition of an
admissible order, this implies that mκab = m
κ
ba = 0.
In order to control the effect of the differences between ξ and ξ˜ , we will
make use of the following notation: p will denote the immediate predecessor
of a in ξ ; in this connection, any statement about p will be understood
to imply the assumption that the set of predecessors of a is not empty.
Similarly, q will denote the immediate successor of b in ξ ; here too, any
statement about q will be understood to imply the assumption that the set
of successors of b is not empty. So, ξ and ξ˜ contain respectively the paths
pabq and pbaq . Finally, x′ means here the immediate successor of x in ξ ,
which is the same as in ξ˜ if x 6= p, a, b .
Let us look first at the superdiagonal intermediate projected margins mσhh′ .
According to their definition, namely equation (12), mσhh′ is the minimum
of a certain set of values of mκxy . In a table where x and y are ordered
according to ξ , this set is an upper-right rectangle with lower-left vertex at
hh′ . Using ξ˜ instead of ξ amounts to interchanging two consecutive columns
and the corresponding rows of that table, namely those labeled by a and b .
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In spite of such a rearrangement, in all cases but one the underlying set from
which the minimum is taken is exactly the same, so the mininum is the same.
The only case where the underlying set is not the same occurs for h = a in
the order ξ , or h = b in the order ξ˜ ; but then the minimum is still the same
because the underlying set includes mκab = m
κ
ba = 0. So,
mσxixi+1 = m˜
σ
x˜ix˜i+1
, for any i = 1, 2, . . . N−1, (26)
mσab = m˜
σ
ba = 0. (27)
On account of the definition of mpixixj and m˜
pi
x˜ix˜j
, (26) results in (25).
Finally, let us see that (24) holds too. To this effect, we begin by noticing
that (27) is saying that
mpiab = m˜
pi
ba = 0 (28)
Let us consider now the equation mpipa = m˜
pi
pb , which is contained in (25).
On account of (23), these equalities entail
mpipb = m
pi
pa = m˜
pi
pb = m˜
pi
pa. (29)
By means of an analogous argument, one obtains also that
mpiaq = m
pi
bq = m˜
pi
aq = m˜
pi
bq. (30)
On the other hand, (25) ensures also that
mpixx′ = m˜
pi
xx′ , whenever x 6= p, a, b. (31)
Finally, (23) allows to go from (28–31) to the desired general equality (24).
Theorem 6.3. The projected scores and their asssociated margins satisfy
the following properties with respect to any admissible order ξ :
(a) The following inequalities hold whenever x ξ y and z 6∈ {x, y}:
vpixy ≥ vpiyx, mpixy ≥ 0, (32)
vpixz ≥ vpiyz, vpizx ≤ vpizy, (33)
mpixz ≥ mpiyz, mpizx ≤ mpizy, (34)
(b) If vpixy = v
pi
yx , or equivalently m
pi
xy = 0, then (33) and (34) are satisfied
all of them with an equality sign.
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Proof. Part (a). Let us begin by noticing that (32) reduces to (22). Notice
also that (33) follows from (34), and that (34.1) and (34.2) are equivalent to
each other. So, it suffices to prove either (34.1) or (34.2). We will distinguish
three cases, namely: (i) x ξ y ξ z ; (ii) z ξ x ξ y ; (iii) x ξ z ξ y .
In case (i), (34.1) follows from (23). In case (ii), (34.2) follows from (23).
Finally, in case (iii) it suffices to use (22) to see that mpixz ≥ 0 ≥ mpiyz .
Part (b). Similarly to part (a), it suffices to prove the statement cor-
responding to (34.1), i. e. that mpixy = 0 implies m
pi
xz = m
pi
yz . This follows
immediately from (23) in cases (i) and (ii). In case (iii), (23) allows to derive
that mpixz = m
pi
zy = 0, and therefore also the equality m
pi
xz = m
pi
yz .
Proposition 6.4. Assume that there exists a total order ξ such that the
original scores and the associated margins satisfy the following conditions:
vxy ≥ vyx, i.e. mxy ≥ 0, whenever x ξ y, (35)
mxz = max (mxy,myz), whenever x ξ y ξ z. (36)
In that case, the projected scores coincide with the original ones.
Proof. We will begin by showing that
mxz ≥ min(mxy,myz), for any x, y, z . (37)
In order to prove this inequality we will distinguish six cases depending on
the relative position of x, y, z according to ξ : (a) If x ξ y ξ z , then (37)
is an immediate consequence of (36). (b) If z ξ y ξ x , then (36) (with
x and z interchanged with each other) gives mzx = max (mzy,myx), which
owing to the antisymmetric character of the margins is equivalent to (37)
with an equality sign. (c) If x ξ z ξ y , then condition (35) guarantees
that mxz ≥ 0 ≥ myz = min(mxy,myz). (d) If z ξ x ξ y , then we have
mxz ≥ myz = min(mxy,myz), where the inequality holds because (36) ensures
that mzy ≥ mzx , and the equality derives from the hypothesis upon ξ .
(e,f) The two remaining cases, namely y ξ x ξ z and y ξ z ξ x , are
analogous respectively to (c) and (d).
Now, since we are in the complete case, the scores vxy and the margins
mxy are related to each other by the monotone increasing transformation
vxy = (1+mxy)/2. Therefore, the inequality (37) on the margins is equivalent
to the following one on the scores:
vxz ≥ min(vxy, vyz), for any x, y, z . (38)
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According to Lemma 4.2, this inequality implies that v∗xy = vxy and therefore
mκxy = mxy . In particular, ξ is ensured to be an admissible order.
Let us now consider any pair xy contained in ξ . By making use of (36)
we see that mσxy = m
κ
xy = mxy . As a consequence, the equality m
pi
xy =
max {mσpp′ | x −
ξ p ξ y } becomes mpixy = max {mpp′ | x −
ξ p ξ y } . From
here, a second application of (36) allows to derive that mpixy = mxy , and
therefore vpixy = vxy .
Since conditions (35–36) of Proposition 6.4 are included among the prop-
erties of the projected Llull matrix according to Lemma 6.1, one can conclude
that they fully characterize the projected Llull matrices, and that the oper-
ator (vxy) 7→ (vpixy) really deserves being called a projection:
Theorem 6.5. The operator P : Γ 3 (vxy) 7→ (vpixy) ∈ Γ is idempotent,
i. e. P 2 = P . Its image PΓ consists of the complete Llull matrices (vxy)
that satisfy (35–36) for some total order ξ .
7 The rank-like rates
Let us recall that the rank-like rates Rx are given by the formula (9), or
equivalently by (10). From these formulas one easily checks that they satisfy
condition D.
Lemma 7.1.
(a) If x ξ y in an admissible order ξ , then Rx ≤ Ry .
(b) Rx = Ry if and only if v
pi
xy = v
pi
yx .
(c) Rx ≤ Ry implies the inequalities (32 – 34).
(d) Rx < Ry if and only if v
pi
xy > v
pi
yx .
(e) vpixy > v
pi
yx implies x ξ y in any admissible order ξ .
Proof. Part (a). It is an immediate consequence of formula (9) together
with the inequalities (32) and (33.1) ensured by Theorem 6.3.
Part (b). From (9) it follows that
Ry −Rx = (vpixy − vpiyx) +
∑
z 6=x
z 6=y
(vpixz − vpiyz). (39)
Let ξ be an admissible order. By symmetry we can assume xy ∈ ξ . As a
consequence, Theorem 6.3 ensures that the terms of (39) which appear in
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parentheses are all of them greater than or equal to zero. So the only pos-
sibility for their sum to vanish is that each of them vanishes separately,
i. e. vpixy = v
pi
yx and v
pi
xz = v
pi
yz for any z 6∈ {x, y} . Finally, part (b) of The-
orem 6.3 ensures that all of these equalities hold as soon as the first one is
satisfied.
Part (c). When the hypothesis is satisfied as a strict inequality, the result
follows by combining the contrapositive of (a) with part (a) of Theorem 6.3.
In the case of equality, it suffices to combine (b) with part (b) of that theorem.
Part (d). It follows from (c) and its contrapositive on account of (b).
Part (e). It follows from (d) and the contrapositive of (a).
The next theorem characterizes the preference relation determined by the
rank-like rates in terms of the indirect comparison relation κ defined in § 2.4:
Theorem 7.2 (2). The rank-like rating given by (9) is related to the indirect
comparison relation κ = µ(v∗) in the following way:
Rx < Ry ⇐⇒ yx 6∈ (κˆ)∗, (40)
Rx ≤ Ry ⇐⇒ xy ∈ (κˆ)∗. (41)
Proof. The statements (40) and (41) are equivalent to each other (via the
contrapositive of each implication plus a swap between x and y ). So it
suffices to prove (40). On the other hand, to establish the latter it suffices
to prove the two following statements:
xy ∈ (κˆ)∗ =⇒ Rx ≤ Ry, (42)
yx 6∈ (κˆ)∗ =⇒ Rx < Ry. (43)
Proof of (42). By transitivity, it suffices to consider the case xy ∈ κˆ .
Now, from Theorem 5.1 one easily sees that xy ∈ κˆ implies that xy belongs
to some admissible order ξ . The conclusion that Rx ≤ Ry is then ensured
by Lemma 7.1.(a).
Proof of (43). Since (κˆ)∗ is complete, yx 6∈ (κˆ)∗ implies xy ∈ (κˆ)∗ and
therefore, according to (42), Rx ≤ Ry . So, (43) will follow if we show that
Rx = Ry =⇒ yx ∈ (κˆ)∗ whenever x 6= y . (44)
Let ξ be an admissible order. Since ξ ⊆ κˆ , the right-hand side of (44) is
automatically true if yx ∈ ξ ; so, it remains to consider the case where xy ∈ ξ .
2We thank an anonymous reviewer for certain remarks that led to the present version
of this theorem, which is stronger than the original one.
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Let us begin by assuming that y = x′ . According to Lemma 7.1.(b), the
equality Rx = Rx′ implies that m
pi
xx′ = 0, that is m
σ
xx′ = 0, which means that
there exist a, b such that a −
ξ x ξ b and mκab = 0. Now, the latter implies
that ba ∈ κˆ , which can be combined with the fact that x′b, ax ∈ ξ ⊆ κˆ
to derive that x′x ∈ (κˆ)∗ (with the obvious modifications if x=a or x′=b).
Finally, if we only know that xy ∈ ξ , we can use Lemma 7.1.(a) to see that
the equality Rx = Ry implies Rp = Rp′ for any p such that x −
ξ p ξ y ,
which reduces the problem to the preceding case.
Corollary 7.3.
(a) Rx < Ry ⇒ xy ∈ κ.
(b) If κˆ is transitive (which is ensured whenever κ is total),
then Rx < Ry ⇔ xy ∈ κ.
(c) If κ contains a set of the form X × Y with X ∪ Y = A,
then Rx < Ry for any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y .
Proof. Part (a). This is an immediate consequence of (40) since
yx 6∈ (κˆ)∗ ⇒ yx 6∈ κˆ ⇔ xy ∈ κ .
Part (b). It is just a matter of noticing that under the hypothesis that
κˆ is transitive the right-hand side of (40) reduces to xy ∈ κ .
Part (c). Let x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . Since X ×Y ⊂ κ ⊆ κˆ , part (a) ensures
that Rx ≤ Ry . So, it suffices to exclude the possibility that Rx = Ry .
By using (40) one easily sees that this equality would imply yx ∈ (κˆ)∗ .
In other words, there would be a path from y ∈ Y to x ∈ X entirely
contained in κˆ . Such a path would have to include a pair ab ∈ κˆ with a ∈ Y
and b ∈ X , which is not possible since ab ∈ κˆ means ba 6∈ κ .
Proposition 7.4. Assume that the votes are total orders. Assume also that
the Llull matrix satisfies the hypothesis of Proposition 6.4. In that case, the
rank-like rates Rx coincide exactly with the mean ranks r¯x .
Proof. Recall that the rank-like rates are related to the projected scores
in the same way as the mean ranks are related to the original scores when
the votes are total orders (§ 2.5). So, the result follows since Proposition 6.4
ensures that the projected scores coincide with the original ones.
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8 Continuity
We claim that the rank-like rates Rx are continuous functions of the binary
scores vxy . The main difficulty in proving this statement lies in the admissible
order ξ , which plays a central role in the computations. Since ξ varies in a
discrete set, its dependence on the data cannot be continuous at all. Even
so, we claim that the final result is still a continuous function of the data.
In this connection, one can consider as data the normalized Llull ma-
trix (vxy), its domain of variation being the set Γ introduced in § 3.3.
Alternatively, one can consider as data the relative frequencies of the possible
votes, i. e. the coefficients αk mentioned also in § 3.3.
Theorem 8.1. The projected scores vpixy and the rank-like rates Rx depend
continuously on the Llull matrix (vxy).
Proof. The dependence of the rank-like rates on the projected scores is
given by formula (9), which is not only continuous but even linear (non-
homogeneous). So we are left with the problem of showing that the projection
P : (vxy) 7→ (vpixy) is continuous. As it has been mentioned above, this is not
so clear, since the projected margins are the result of certain operations
which are based upon an admissible order ξ which is determined separately.
However, we will see, on the one hand, that P is continuous as long as
ξ remains unchanged, and on the other hand, that the results of § 5–6 allow
to conclude that P is continuous on the whole of Γ in spite of the fact
that ξ can change. In the following we will use the following notation:
for every total order ξ , we denote by Γξ the subset of Γ which consists
of the Llull matrices for which ξ is an admissible order, and we denote by
Pξ the restriction of P to Γξ .
We claim that the mapping Pξ is continuous for every total order ξ .
In order to check the truth of this statement, one has to go over the different
mappings whose composition defines Pξ (see § 2.6), namely: (vxy) 7→ (mκxy),
(mκxy) 7→ (mσxy), and finally (mσxx′) 7→ (mpixy) 7→ (vpixy). All of these mappings
are certainly continuous since they involve only additions and substractions
as well as the max and min operations.
Finally, the continuity of P (and the fact that it is well-defined) is a con-
sequence of the following facts (see for instance [14 : § 2-7 ]): (a) Γ = ⋃ξ Γξ ;
this is true because of the existence of ξ (Theorem 5.1). (b) Γξ is a closed
subset of Γ; this is true because Γξ is described by a set of non-strict inequal-
ities which concern quantities that are continuous functions of (vxy) (namely
the inequalities mκxy ≥ 0 whenever xy ∈ ξ ). (c) ξ varies over a finite set.
(d) Pξ coincides with Pη at Γξ ∩ Γη , as it is proved in Theorem 6.2.
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Corollary 8.2. The rank-like rates depend continuously on the relative fre-
quency of each possible content of an individual vote.
Proof. It suffices to recall that the Llull matrix (vxy) is simply the center of
gravity of the distribution specified by these relative frequencies (formula (19)
of § 3.3).
9 Decomposition
Property E is concerned with having a partition of A in two sets X and Y
such that each member of X is unanimously preferred to any member of Y ,
that is:
vxy = 1 (and therefore vyx = 0) whenever xy ∈ X × Y . (45)
According to property E, to be proved in the present section, in the com-
plete case considered in this article such a situation is characterized by the
following equalities:
Rx = R˜x, for all x ∈ X, (46)
Ry = R˜y + |X|, for all y ∈ Y , (47)∑
x∈X
Rx = |X| (|X|+ 1)/2, (48)
where R˜x and R˜y denote the rank-like rates which are determined respec-
tively from the submatrices associated with X and Y . More specifically,
each of preceding equalities is separately equivalent to (45).
In the following we will continue using a tilde to distinguish between hom-
ologous objects associated respectively with the whole matrix and with its
submatrices associated with X and Y .
Lemma 9.1. Given a partition A = X ∪ Y in two disjoint nonempty sets,
one has the following equivalences:
vxy = 1
∀xy ∈ X × Y
}
⇐⇒
{
mκxy=1
∀xy ∈ X × Y
}
⇐⇒
{
vpixy = 1
∀xy ∈ X × Y (49)
Proof. Assume that vxy = 1 for all xy ∈ X × Y . Then vyx = 0, for all
such pairs, which implies that vγ vanishes for any path γ which goes from Y
to X . This fact, together with the inequality v∗xy ≥ vxy , entails the following
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equalities for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y : v∗yx = 0, v∗xy = 1, and consequently
mκxy = 1.
Assume now that mκxy = 1 for all xy ∈ X × Y . Let ξ be an admissible
order. As an immediate consequence of the definition, it includes the set
X × Y . Let ` be the last element of X according to ξ . From the present
hypothesis it is clear that mσ``′ = 1, which entails that v
pi
xy = 1 for every
xy ∈ X × Y .
Assume now that vpixy = 1 for all xy ∈ X × Y . Let ξ be an admissible
order. Here too, we are ensured that it includes the set X × Y ; this is so
by virtue of Theorem 6.3.(a). Let ` be the last element of X according
to ξ . From the fact that mσ``′ = m
pi
``′ = 1, one infers that m
κ
xy = 1 for all
xy ∈ X × Y .
Finally, let us assume again that mκxy = 1 for all xy ∈ X × Y . Since
mκxy = v
∗
xy − v∗yx and both terms of this difference belong to [0, 1], the only
possibility is v∗xy = 1 and v
∗
yx = 0, which implies that vyx = 0. This equality
is equivalent to vxy = 1.
Lemma 9.2. Condition (45) implies, for any admissible order, the follow-
ing equalities:
mσxx′ = m˜
σ
xx′ , whenever x, x
′ ∈ X, (50)
mσyy′ = m˜
σ
yy′ , whenever y, y
′ ∈ Y , (51)
Proof. As we saw in the proof of Lemma 9.1, condition (45) implies the
vanishing of vγ for any path γ which goes from Y to X . Besides the
conclusions obtained in that lemma, this implies also the following equalities:
v∗xx¯ = v˜
∗
xx¯, m
κ
xx¯ = m˜
κ
xx¯, for all x, x¯ ∈ X, (52)
v∗yy¯ = v˜
∗
yy¯, m
κ
yy¯ = m˜
κ
yy¯, for all y, y¯ ∈ Y . (53)
Let us fix an admissible order ξ . The second equality of (49) not only ensures
that ξ includes the set X × Y , but it can also be combined with (52) and
(53) to obtain respectively (50) and (51).
Theorem 9.3. Conditions (45), (46), (47) and (48) are equivalent to each
other.
Proof. Part (a): (45) =⇒ (46), (47) and (48). As a consequence of (50)
and (51) we get the following equalities:
vpixx¯ = v˜
pi
xx¯, for all x, x¯ ∈ X, (54)
vpiyy¯ = v˜
pi
yy¯, for all y, y¯ ∈ Y . (55)
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On the other hand, Lemma 9.1 ensures that
vpixy = 1, for all xy ∈ X × Y . (56)
When the projected scores are introduced in (9) these equalities result in
(46) and (47). Finally, (48) is an immediate consequence of (46).
Part (b): (46) ⇒ (45); (47) ⇒ (45). On account of formula (9), con-
ditions (46) and (47) are easily seen to be respectively equivalent to the
following equalities:∑
y∈A
y 6=x
vpixy =
∑
x¯∈X
x¯ 6=x
v˜pixx¯ + |Y |, for all x ∈ X, (57)
∑
x∈A
x 6=y
vpiyx =
∑
y¯∈Y
y¯ 6=y
v˜piyy¯ for all y ∈ Y . (58)
Let us add up respectively the equalities (57) over x ∈ X and the equalities
(58) over y ∈ Y . Since vpipq + vpiqp = v˜pipq + v˜piqp = 1, we obtain∑
x∈X
y∈Y
vpixy = |X| |Y |, (59)
∑
y∈Y
x∈X
vpiyx = 0. (60)
Since the projected scores belong to [0, 1], the preceding equalities imply
respectively
vpixy = 1, for all xy ∈ X × Y , (61)
vpiyx = 0, for all xy ∈ X × Y , (62)
which are equivalent to each other since vpixy + v
pi
yx = 1. Finally, Lemma 9.1
allows to arrive at (45).
Part (c): (48) ⇒ (45). From the definition of Rx and the fact that vpixy ≤
vpixy + v
pi
yx = 1, one easily derives the inequality
∑
x∈X Rx ≥ |X| (|X|+ 1)/2,
with equality if and only if (61) holds. So, the result follows again by
Lemma 9.1.
Corollary 9.4.
(a) Rx = 1 if and only if vxy = 1 for all y 6= x.
(b) Rx = N if and only if vxy = 0 for all y 6= x.
Proof. It suffices to apply Theorem 9.3 to the special cases X = {x} and
X = A \ {x} . The result can also be obtained directly from Lemma 9.1.
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10 The Condorcet-Smith principle
Theorem 10.1. Both the indirect majority relation κ = µ(v∗) and the pref-
erence relation determined by the rank-like rates comply with the Condorcet-
Smith principle: If A is partitioned in two sets X and Y with the property
that vxy > 1/2 for any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , then one has also xy ∈ κ and
Rx < Ry for any such x and y .
Proof. Assume that x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . Since v∗xy ≥ vxy , the hypothesis
of the theorem entails that v∗xy > 1/2. On the other hand, let γ be a path
from y to x such that v∗yx = vγ ; since it goes from Y to X , this path must
contain at least one link yiyi+1 with yi ∈ Y and yi+1 ∈ X ; now, for this
link we have vyiyi+1 ≤ 1 − vyi+1yi < 1/2, which entails that v∗yx = vγ < 1/2.
Therefore, we get v∗yx < 1/2 < v
∗
xy , i. e. xy ∈ κ . Finally, the fact that this
holds for any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y implies, by Corollary 7.3.(c), that one has
also Rx < Ry for any such x and y .
11 Clone consistency
Clone consistency (also known as independence of clones) refers to the effect
of adding or deleting similar options. For many voting methods, this may
change the outcome in a substantial way. For instance, replacing a single
option c by a set C of several options similar to c may change the result
from c being the winner to giving the victory to some option outside C .
This does not seem right: if c deserves being chosen when going alone, then
in the second situation the right choice should be some member of C .
The notion of similarity that is relevant here can be formalized by the
concept of autonomous set that was introduced in § 3.1. Recall that C being
autonomous for a given binary relation means that each element from out-
side C relates to all elements of C in the same way. In the context of voting
theory, autonomous sets are often called sets of clones. So, it makes sense
to ask for the following property, which we call clone consistency: If a set
of options is autonomous for each of the individual votes, then: (a) this set
is also autonomous for the social ranking; and (b) contracting it to a single
option in all of the individual votes has no other effect in the social ranking
than getting the same contraction.
This requirement was introduced in 1986–87 by Thomas M. Zavist and
T. Nicolaus Tideman, who also devised a method that satisfies it, namely
the rule of ranked pairs [19, 21 ].
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This section is aimed at proving this property for both the indirect com-
parison relation κ as well as the preference relation determined by the rank-
like rates. The core results were obtained by Markus Schulze [15 c , 16 ].
11.1 In order to prepare the ground, we need to deal first with certain
generalities. To begin with, the notion of an autonomous set will be extended
to apply not only to a relation, as defined in § 3.1, but also to any valued
relation (vxy): A subset C ⊆ A will be said to be autonomous for (vxy)
when
vax = vbx, vxa = vxb, whenever a, b ∈ C and x 6∈ C . (63)
This definition can be viewed as an extension of that given in § 3.1 because
of the following fact, which follows easily from the definitions:
Lemma 11.1. Given a binary relation ρ, let uxy and vxy be the binary
scores defined respectively by
uxy =
{
1, if xy ∈ ρ,
0, if xy /∈ ρ; vxy =

1, if xy ∈ ρ and yx /∈ ρ,
1/2, if xy ∈ ρ and yx ∈ ρ,
0, if xy /∈ ρ.
(64)
One has the following equivalences:
(a) C is autonomous for ρ if and only if C is autonomous for (uxy).
(b) C is autonomous for ρ if and only if C is autonomous for (vxy).
Lemma 11.2. Assume that C ⊂ A is autonomous for (vxy). Assume also
that either x or y , or both, lie outside C . In this case
v∗xy = max { vγ | γ contains no more than one element of C }
Proof. It suffices to see that any path γ = x0 . . . xn from x0 = x to xn = y
which contains more than one element of C can be replaced by another
one γ˜ which contains only one such element and satisfies vγ˜ ≥ vγ . Con-
sider first the case where x, y 6∈ C . In this case it will suffice to take γ˜ =
x0 . . . xj−1xk . . . xn , where j = min { i | xi ∈ C } and k = max { i | xi ∈ C } ,
which obviously satisfy 0 < j < k < n . Since xj−1 6∈ C and xj, xk ∈ C ,
we have vxj−1xj = vxj−1xk , so that
vγ = min
(
vx0x1 , . . . , vxn−1xn
)
≤ min (vx0x1 , . . . , vxj−1xj , vxkxk+1 , . . . , vxn−1xn)
= min
(
vx0x1 , . . . , vxj−1xk , vxkxk+1 , . . . , vxn−1xn
)
= vγ˜.
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The case where x 6∈ C but y ∈ C can be dealt with in a similar way
by taking γ˜ = x0 . . . xj−1xn , and analogously, in the case where x ∈ C and
y 6∈ C it suffices to take γ˜ = x0xk+1 . . . xn .
Proposition 11.3. If C ⊂ A is autonomous for the scores (vxy), then C is
autonomous also for the indirect scores (v∗xy).
Proof. Consider a, b ∈ C and x 6∈ C . Let γ = x0x1x2 . . . xn be a path from
a to x such that v∗ax = vγ . By Lemma 11.2, we can assume that a is the only
element of γ that belongs to C . In particular, x1 6∈ C , so that vax1 = vbx1 ,
which allows to write
v∗ax = vγ = min
(
vax1 , vx1x2 , . . . , vxn−1x
)
= min
(
vbx1 , vx1x2 , . . . , vxn−1x
) ≤ v∗bx.
By interchanging a and b , one gets the reverse inequality v∗bx ≤ v∗ax and there-
fore the equality v∗ax=v
∗
bx . An analogous argument shows that v
∗
xa=v
∗
xb .
Corollary 11.4. If C ⊂ A is autonomous for a relation ρ, then C is
autonomous also for the transitive closure ρ∗ .
Proof. Because of Proposition 11.3 and Lemma 11.1.(a).
11.2 The next results assume that C ⊂ A is autonomous for the Llull
matrix of a vote. Obviously, this assumption is satisfied whenever C is au-
tonomous for all of the individual votes (which can be allowed to be arbitrary
elements of Γ as mentioned in § 3.3).
Theorem 11.5. Assume that C ⊂ A is autonomous for the Llull matrix
(vxy). Then C is autonomous for the indirect comparison relation κ = µ(v
∗)
as well as for the total preorder determined by the rank-like rates (i. e. for
the relation ωˆ = {xy ∈ Π | Rx ≤ Ry}).
Proof. Proposition 11.3 ensures that C is autonomous for the indirect scores
(v∗xy), from which one easily derives that C is autonomous for the relation κ .
Now, according to Theorem 7.2, ωˆ = (κˆ)∗ . So the statement about ωˆ follows
by virtue of Lemma 3.2 and Corollary 11.4.
Theorem 11.6. Assume that C ⊂ A is autonomous for the Llull matrix
(vxy). Then C is autonomous also for the projected scores (v
pi
xy).
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Proof. Since vpixy = (1 + m
pi
xy)/2, it suffices to show that C is autonomous
for the projected margins (mpixy). By Theorem 11.3, we know that C is au-
tonomous for the indirect scores (v∗xy), which immediately implies its being
autonomous also for the indirect margins (mκxy). So the problem lies at show-
ing that the autonomy of C is maintained when going from (mκxy) to (m
pi
xy)
via the procedure (11–14). In the following we let ξ be an admissible order
and we distinguish two cases depending on whether C is or not an interval
for ξ .
Assume first that C is an interval of ξ . Since margins are antisymmetric,
in order to prove that C is autonomous for (mpixy) it suffices to show that
mpixa = m
pi
xb, for any a, b ∈ C and x ξ C, (65)
mpiay = m
pi
by, for any a, b ∈ C and C ξ y. (66)
In the following we prove (65), the proof of (66) being entirely analogous.
If there are no x ξ C there is nothing to prove. Otherwise, let k be the
immediate predecessor of the first element of C . By using (13), one easily
sees that (65) will follow if we show that
mσcc′ ≤ mσkk′ , for any c ∈ C . (67)
Now, this inequality holds because
mσcc′ = min {mκpq | p −
ξ c, c′ −
ξ q } ≤ min {mκpq | p −
ξ k, c′ −
ξ q }
= min {mκpq | p −
ξ k, k′ −
ξ q } = mσkk′ ,
where the inequality is due to the fact that we pass to a smaller set, and the
equality that starts the second line holds because k′ −
ξ q −
ξ c implies q ∈ C ,
whereas p −
ξ k implies p 6∈ C , so that mκpq = mκpk′ for such p and q .
Assume now that C is not an interval of ξ . That is, there exist a, b ∈ C
and x 6∈ C such that a ξ x ξ b . This implies that ax, xb ∈ κˆ . Since we
know that C is autonomous for κ , it follows that cx, xc ∈ κˆ for all c ∈ C ,
that is, mκcx = m
κ
xc = 0 for all c ∈ C . From this fact one easily derives,
using (12), that mσpp′ = 0 for all p ∈ A such that p, p′ ∈ C¯ , where C¯ means
the minimum interval of ξ that contains C . Finally, this entails, using (13),
that mpixy = 0 for all x, y ∈ C¯ , and that any subset of C¯ , in particular the
set C , is autonomous for (mpixy).
11.3 Finally, we consider the effect of contracting C to a single element.
In this connection we will make use of the notation and definitions of § 3.1,
together with the following natural extension to a system of binary scores:
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if (vxy) admits C as an autonomous set, the contracted binary scores (v˜x˜y˜)
are characterized by the equality v˜x˜y˜ = vxy whenever x˜ 6= y˜ . In the follow-
ing, a tilde is systematically used to distinguish between homologous objects
associated respectively with (A, v) and (A˜, v˜).
Theorem 11.7. Assume that C ⊂ A is autonomous for the Llull matrix
(vxy). Then the relation κ˜ coincides with the contraction of κ by the au-
tonomous set C . Similarly, the relation ˆ˜ω = {xy ∈ Π˜ | R˜x ≤ R˜y} coincides
with the contraction of ωˆ = {xy ∈ Π | Rx ≤ Ry} by C .
Proof. We begin by noticing that the operation of taking indirect scores
commutes with that of contraction by the autonomous set C , i. e. v˜∗x˜y˜ = v
∗
xy
whenever x˜ 6= y˜ . This is a consequence of Lemma 11.2. As a consequence,
κ˜ = µ(v˜∗) coincides with the contraction of κ = µ(v∗) by C , and simi-
larly for ˆ˜κ and κˆ . On the other hand, a second application of Lemma 11.2
—to the binary scores associated with the relation κˆ by formula (64.1)—
ensures that (ˆ˜κ)∗ is the contraction of (κˆ)∗ . Finally, in order to see that ˆ˜ω
is the contraction of ωˆ it is just a matter of applying Theorem 7.2: For any
x, y ∈ A such that x˜ 6= y˜ , we have R˜x˜ ≤ R˜ y˜ ⇔ x˜y˜ ∈ (ˆ˜κ)∗ ⇔ xy ∈ (κˆ)∗ ⇔
Rx ≤ Ry.
12 About monotonicity
In this section we consider the effect of raising a particular option a to a
more preferred status in the individual ballots without any change in the
preferences about the other options. More generally, we consider the case
where the scores vxy are modified into new values v˜xy such that
v˜ay ≥ vay, v˜xa ≤ vxa, v˜xy = vxy, ∀x, y 6= a. (68)
In such a situation, one would expect the social rates to behave in the fol-
lowing way, where y is an arbitrary element of A \ {a} :
R˜a ≤ Ra, (69)
Ra < Ry =⇒ R˜a < R˜y, Ra ≤ Ry =⇒ R˜a ≤ R˜y, (70)
where the tilde indicates the objects associated with the modified scores.
Unfortunately, the rating method proposed in this paper does not satisfy
these conditions, but generally speaking it satisfies only the following weaker
ones:
Ra < Ry =⇒ R˜a ≤ R˜y. (71)
(Ra < Ry, ∀y 6= a) =⇒ (R˜a < R˜y, ∀y 6= a). (72)
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In plain words, (72) is saying that if a was the only winner for the scores
vxy , then it is still the only winner for the scores v˜xy .
An example exhibiting the lack of property (70) can be found in [13 : num-
ber 10 of “Example inputs” ].
In this connection, it is interesting to remark that the method of ranked
pairs enjoys also property (72) [20 : p. 221–222 ], but it fails at (71). A profile
which exhibits this failure of (71) for the method of ranked pairs is given in
[13 : number 9 of “Example inputs” ].
The remainder of this section is devoted to proving properties (71) and (72).
Theorem 12.1. Assume that (vxy) and (v˜xy) are related to each other in
accordance with (68). In this case, the following properties are satisfied for
any x, y 6= a:
v˜∗ay ≥ v∗ay, v˜∗xa ≤ v∗xa, (73)
(71) Ra < Ry =⇒ R˜a ≤ R˜y. (74)
Proof. Let κ = µ(v∗) and κ˜ = µ(v˜∗). Observe that (73) implies
m˜κay ≥ mκay, m˜κya ≤ mκya, ∀y 6= a. (75)
We begin by seeing that (74) will be a consequence of (73). In fact, we
have the following chain of implications: Ra < Ry ⇒ ay ∈ κ ⇔ mκay > 0
⇒ m˜κay > 0 ⇔ ay ∈ κ˜ ⇒ R˜a ≤ R˜y , where the central implication is
provided by (75) and the other two strict implications are guaranteed by
Corollary 7.3.(a). So, the problem has been reduced to proving (73).
Now, in order to obtain the indirect score for a pair of the form ay it
is useless to consider paths involving xa for some x 6= a , since such paths
contain cycles whose omission results in paths having a larger or equal score.
So, the maximum which defines v∗ay is realized by a path which does not
involve any pair xa . For such a path γ we have
v∗ay = vγ ≤ v˜γ ≤ v˜∗ay,
where the first inequality follows directly by (68). An analogous argument
gives v˜∗xa ≤ v∗xa .
Corollary 12.2 (3). Under the hypothesis of Theorem 12.1 one has also the
property (72).
3We thank Markus Schulze for pointing out this fact.
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Proof. According to Corollary 7.3.(a), the left-hand side of (72) implies
the strict inequality v∗ay > v
∗
ya for all y 6= a . Now, this inequality can
be combined with (73) to derive that v˜∗ay > v˜
∗
ya for all y 6= a . Finally,
Corollary 7.3.(c) with X = {a} and Y = A \ {a} guarantees that the right-
hand side of (72) is satisfied.
13 Concluding remarks and open questions
To our knowledge, the existing literature does not offer any other rating
method that combines the quantitative properties of continuity and decom-
position with the Condorcet-Smith principle. As it has been pointed out in
the introduction, the latter is quite pertinent when one is interested not only
in choosing a winner but in ranking all the alternatives (or in rating them).
In particular, the Borda rule (linearly equivalent to rating the options by
their mean ranks) satisfies those two quantitative properties, but it does
not comply with the Condorcet principle. Quite interestingly, the maximin
rates, namely σx = miny 6=x vxy , combine continuity and a certain form of
decomposition with the standard Condorcet principle, that is, condition M
restricted to the case where the subset X reduces to a single option.4 How-
ever, they easily fail at this condition when the subset X contains several
options; a counterexample is given for instance in [20 : p. 212–213 ].
One may ask whether the CLC rating method is the only one that sat-
isfies properties A–E and M. The answer to this question is surely negative:
Although we are imposing sharp constraints on the rates to be obtained at
certain special points of the Llull matrix space, in between these points there
is still some degree of freedom (in particular, because rates vary in a con-
tinuum). This remaining freedom might allow for imposing some additional
property. In this connection, we find especially interesting the following
Open question 1. Can one give a rating method that satisfies A–E and
M together with quantitative monotonicity in the sense that new Llull scores
satisfying (68) implies new rates satisfying (69–70)?
It is also natural to ask whether an alternative rating method with the
same properties could be given where the underlying ranking method were
not Schulze’s method of paths, but some other one. In this connection, we
consider especially interesting, because of their properties, the celebrated
rule of Condorcet, Keme´ny and Young [12 ; 20 : p. 182–190 ], as well as the
ranked-pairs one [19 , 21 ; 20 : p. 219–223 ]:
4We thank Salvador Barbera` for having called our attention to the maximin rating.
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Open question 2. Is the rule of Condorcet, Keme´ny and Young compatible
with a continuous rating method satisfying A–E?
Open question 3. Is the ranked-pairs rule compatible with a continuous
rating method satisfying A–E?
On the basis of a previous exploratory work, we believe that the answer to
questions 2 and 3 is in both cases negative. More deeply into the question,
one can ask:
Open question 4 (5). Which properties characterize those ranking methods
that can be extended into rating methods satisfying properties A–E?
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